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Grete Hermann belongs in the canon of Western philosophy. At the start of her career she produced 
noteworthy work on abstract algebra as Emmy Noether’s first doctoral student at Göttingen. From 
1926 on she turned to philosophy, and arguably became the most significant philosopher of physics 
and one of the most original neo-Kantian philosophers of the interwar period. She continued to 
make notable contributions to philosophy, but dedicated the second half of her career to 
reconstructing the educational system in post-war Germany. 
Hermann has always been known as a figure of significance in the foundations of quantum 
mechanics, thanks to the chapter devoted to her by Heisenberg in Physics and Beyond (Heisenberg 
1971) – whose title I borrow here – and to the ever-informed Max Jammer who discusses her work 
in some detail in The Philosophy of Quantum Mechanics (Jammer 1974). A renewed interest in 
Hermann as a philosopher of physics and neo-Kantian natural philosopher was arguably sparked by 
the volume by Léna Soler that included the French translation of Hermann’s main essay on quantum 
mechanics (Hermann 1996), and by Dirk Lumma’s English edition of the short version of the same 
(Hermann 1999).  
This volume, edited by Kay Herrmann (no relation – two ‘r’s), collects now in the original German 
Hermann’s entire published output on mathematics, philosophy of physics, and neo-Kantian natural 
philosophy, some further published and unpublished work, and more than fifty letters exchanged 
with Werner Heisenberg, Carl Friedrich von Weizsäcker, Paul Bernays, Max Jammer, Bartel van der 
Waerden and others. Brief introductory essays are included, as is a short section containing material 
on Heisenberg and Weizsäcker and reviews of two of Hermann’s works by the latter.1 The volume 
does not aim to cover Hermann’s work in ethics and politics,2 or her contributions to education,3 but 
I hope to make clear that the material covered already amply substantiates my opening claim. 
 
* Descartes Centre for the History and Philosophy of the Sciences and the Humanities, Utrecht University 
(email: g.bacciagaluppi@uu.nl). 
1 This is a far wider selection of Hermann’s works than is found in the English-language counterpart to this 
volume (Crull and Bacciagaluppi 2017, also reviewed in this issue) – which includes instead more detailed 
secondary material. 
2 A volume in German collecting significant works in these areas (Henry-Hermann 1985) was published shortly 
after Hermann’s death. 
3 I know of no study of Hermann’s work in education, or of its links to her work in philosophy (hinted at, e.g., in 
Letters 45 and 46). 
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Section 2 of this essay review will provide a brief biographical sketch of Grete Hermann, followed in 
Section 3 by an overview of the volume. Section 4 will then sketch the development of Hermann’s 
views, drawing on her works and correspondence as collected in Parts II and III of the volume.4 
Translations of three short but representative papers from Part II are published alongside this 
review, with a separate introduction. It is to be hoped that the volume in its entirety will also be 
translated soon, making Hermann’s work widely available to non-German speakers.5 If not otherwise 
noted, page numbers refer to the volume under review, as do numbered references to letters.6  
 
2 Biographical sketch7 
Grete Hermann was born in Bremen in 1901. After being one of the few girls allowed to attend the 
Neues Gymnasium there, and after further obtaining a teacher’s certificate, she enrolled at 
Göttingen in 1921 to read mathematics, physics and philosophy. She became Emmy Noether’s first 
doctoral student there, as well as following courses by the neo-Kantian Leonard Nelson, whose 
assistant – after some hesitation – she became in January 1926, leaving mathematics for philosophy.  
Nelson was a charismatic figure who had revived the philosophy of Jakob Friedrich Fries (1773–
1843).8 Fries’ philosophy was characterised by a critique of Kant's trascendental deduction: one 
cannot derive abstractly the conditions of possible experience, but only investigate them through a 
process of reflection on actual cognition (hence his own characterisation of his critique of reason as 
‘anthropological’). This leads among other things to a conception of knowledge as fallible and apt to 
empirical revision. In particular, as we shall see, the criteria of application of the Kantian notions are 
open to empirical investigation. A further innovation with respect to Kant is a widening of the 
conception of science beyond the disciplines that are mathematised, apodictic and systematic, thus 
including sciences such as biology, chemistry and psychology. Indeed, Nelson’s own circle and 
influence extended to scientists in many fields. Nelson placed great emphasis on the rational 
foundation of ethics. This led in turn to his founding of various political and educational 
organisations, which operated also after Nelson’s early death in 1927.9 They intensified activities in 
 
4 In two separate papers, I shall analyse in greater detail Hermann’s contributions to neo-Kantian (natural) 
philosophy and her work on quantum mechanics, respectively (Bacciagaluppi in preparation a,b). 
5 Key papers that cry out for translation are the two main papers of 1937, especially ‘Über die Grundlagen 
physikalischer Aussagen in den älteren und den modernen Theorien’ [‘On the foundations of physical 
statements in the older and the modern theories’] (pp. 275–334), as well as ‘Die Kausalität in der Physik’ 
[‘Causality in Physics’] (pp. 383–397) from 1948. See the Appendix for an overview of existing translations of 
Hermann’s works.  
6 All translations are either mine or from Crull and Bacciagaluppi (2017), in which case I add also the page 
reference to that volume. All emphases are original. 
7 This subsection is mainly based on Hansen-Schaberg (2017) and on Hansen-Schaberg’s essay in the volume 
under review (pp. 25–40). 
8 For this very brief characterisation of Fries, I mainly follow Paparo (2017), which is more detailed than 
Paparo’s essay in the volume under review. See also Pulte (1999), Geldsetzer (1999), and Gregory (2006), and 
(with special reference to Hermann) Crull (2017), Leal (2017), Cuffaro (2020) and Bacciagaluppi (in preparation 
a). 
9 See, e.g., Paparo (2017) and Leal (2017). The ethical foundation of Nelson’s socialism led to the expulsion of 
the Nelsonians from the German Social Democratic Party (SPD), since ethics is an ideological superstructure 
from a Marxist point of view. As a consequence, Nelson founded also a separate political party, the 
Internationaler Sozialistischer Kampfbund (ISK) [often translated as Militant Socialist International]. Much 
later, the Nelsonians were instrumental in the drafting of the Godesberg Programme, which the SPD adopted 
in 1959 rejecting Marxism in favour of ethically based socialism – crucially Willi Eichler (who headed the ISK 
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the run-up to Hitler’s seizure of power, in particular with the publication of the socialist daily Der 
Funke [The Spark]. To this Hermann contributed regularly, either as herself or as ‘S. H.’ co-authoring 
with Minna Specht (also known as ‘Dora’ to her Nelsonian friends). She also acted with Specht as 
Nelson’s literary executor.  
After the forced cessation of open political activity, Hermann started developing her own distinct 
line of research in philosophy. In 1933–1935 she worked mainly on quantum mechanics, in particular 
spending five or six months in 1934 with Heisenberg in Leipzig. This work culminated in March 1935 
with the publication of a long essay in the Abhandlungen der Fries’schen Schule, the journal founded 
by Nelson. Between the summer of 1934 and that of 1937 she lived and taught at the exile school of 
the Nelsonians in the Danish Østrupgård,10 while continuing with both non-frontline political 
activities and research in philosophy. Specifically, in 1936–1937 she extended her analysis of modern 
physics to include special and general relativity as well as Maxwellian electrodynamics, and outlined 
a comprehensive neo-Friesian position in natural philosophy. 
Hermann’s work in natural philosophy then slowed down. She spent the war in exile in England 
(where she had entered a marriage of convenience and started using the name Grete Henry or Grete 
Henry-Hermann). There, as she had since 1935, she continued to contribute under various 
pseudonyms to the exile paper Sozialistische Warte [Socialist Lookout] run by the Nelsonians. Her 
contributions were engaged pieces of political and cultural commentary and calls to plan for the 
reconstruction after the war – a task to which she actively contributed in the union of socialist 
German organisations in Great Britain (on whose executive committee she was) and in the German 
Educational Reconstruction Committee founded by Minna Specht. She was also a founding member 
of the (still active) Society for the Furtherance of Critical Philosophy, initially set up to support the 
exile school which had moved to Wales, but had to close when the war began and Specht and the 
other teachers were interned for a while as enemy aliens. 
When she returned to Germany after the war, Hermann became director of the new Pädagogische 
Hochschule [Teacher Training College] in Bremen and was heavily engaged in the reconstruction of 
the educational system in Germany in various capacities, in particular as a member of the Deutscher 
Ausschuss für Erziehungs- und Bildungswesen [German Committee for the Education System], an 
independent committee advising the States and the Federation on education. Her published work in 
the post-war period includes discussions of the wider relevance of modern science and natural 
philosophy, and work on ethics revising Nelson’s ‘absolutist’ position. She also strived towards a 
parallel more comprehensive re-assessment of neo-Friesian natural philosophy. Hermann remained 
active in the Nelsonian and the socialist movements in Germany up to her death in Bremen in 1984.   
 
3 Overview of the volume 
 
after Nelson’s death), but as Hansen-Schaberg remarks (p. 34) also Hermann herself. Hermann’s ‘Ethik und 
Naturwissenschaft’ [‘Ethics and natural science’] (pp. 399–407) was also written in the context of the 
programmatic debate within the SPD. For Hermann’s political activity, see especially Hansen-Schaberg’s essay 
in the volume under review (pp. 25–40). 
10 Nelson had set up a training institution for members of the ISK, the Walkemühle near Melsungen in Hessen. 
The ISK was in fact one of the most effective groups in the underground political resistance to Hitler before the 
war. The Walkemühle included also a children's section, which adopted radically liberal educational principles, 
and should perhaps be seen in the line of legendary reform schools such as Summerhill. For more on the 
Walkemühle school see, e.g., Hansen-Schaberg (1992). 
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Part I of the volume (pp. 1–91) contains seven short essays by the editor and other contributors, as 
follows.  
Giulia Paparo provides a lucid and informative introduction to the neo-Kantian tradition of natural 
philosophy initiated by Jakob Friedrich Fries and renewed by Leonard Nelson, and of how Hermann 
fits within it.  
Kay Herrmann briefly sketches Hermann’s specific analysis of quantum mechanics, and how that 
forms the template for her other work on physics, with particular reference to Maxwell’s 
electrodynamics.  
A superb description of Hermann’s political engagement throughout her career is then given by Inge 
Hansen-Schaberg, with many notable details especially of Hermann’s activities during her exile from 
Nazi Germany.  
The next two essays, by Peter Ullrich and by Karl-Heinz Kiyek, usefully complement each other in 
describing the historical context and mathematical details of Hermann’s dissertation with Emmy 
Noether, and are best read together.  
Finally, in the last two essays, Caroline Littlejohn Herzenberg provides a wider panorama on 
Hermann’s views on quantum mechanics, and Dieter Suter puts them in the context of other 
discussions of incompleteness and non-locality, especially the Bell inequalities.  
These essays pave the wave for the extremely substantial Part II (pp. 93–432) which collects fifteen 
works by Hermann from the period 1925–1973. These are ordered chronologically, but the order 
also corresponds to the systematic development of Hermann’s interests along the years.  
(a) Mathematics is represented by her 1925 doctoral dissertation ‘Die Frage der endlich vielen 
Schritte in der Theorie der Polynomideale’ [‘The Question of Finitely Many Steps in the Theory of 
Polynomial Ideals’] (Hermann 1998). The volume reproduces it unaltered from the Mathematische 
Annalen, where it was published in 1926 (pp. 97–147).  
(b) Neo-Kantian reflections on epistemology follow in the period 1926–1930. We have first an 
unpublished talk that Hermann gave in July 1926, as part of Nelson’s characteristically titled course 
on ‘Rückschritte der Metaphysik seit Kant’ [‘Regresses in Metaphysics since Kant’] (pp. 149–172).11 It 
criticises the philosophy of Bernard Bolzano (1781–1848). This talk is followed by two appendices to 
a paper on ‘Fries und die Psychologie des Sehens’ [‘Fries and the Psychology of Sight’] published by 
Ludwig Ruben in the Abhandlungen (Ruben 1930). The first of the appendices by Hermann criticises 
‘nativist’ views (pp. 174–177), the longer second one is a discussion of Gestalt theory (pp. 177–183) 
– both from a Friesian perspective.  
(c) Quantum mechanics was the main focus of Hermann’s philosophical work in the period 1933–
1935, and is represented by five papers from the years 1933–1936. The first is a manuscript from 
1933, ‘Determinismus und Quantenmechanik’ (pp. 185–203) [‘Determinism and Quantum 
Mechanics’ (Crull and Bacciagaluppi 2017, pp. 223–237)] – recently rediscovered in the Dirac Archive 
(document DRAC 3/11) – in which Hermann criticises alleged proofs of the completeness of the 
theory, including von Neumann’s famous theorem, and thereby rebuts existing claims that quantum 
mechanics refutes the Kantian thesis of causality. This is the first publication of this manuscript in 
the original German.  
 
11Cf. the catalogue of Hermann’s Nachlass (with many thanks to Giulia Paparo for providing me with a copy). 
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There follows Hermann’s main essay on the subject, ‘Die naturphilosophischen Grundlagen der 
Quantenmechanik’ (pp. 205–258) [‘Natural-philosophical Foundations of Quantum Mechanics’ (Crull 
and Bacciagaluppi 2017, pp. 239–278)], published in the Abhandlungen in March 1935, in which, 
after expanding on her previous criticisms of extant arguments, Hermann develops her own 
argument for the completeness of quantum mechanics, as in fact already containing the causes of all 
measurement results. Quantum mechanics does not refute Kant on causality, rather it separates the 
two notions of causality and predictability, because quantum mechanics describes nature relative to 
particular contexts of observation. Within each context, causality still applies, but predictability is 
lost in the change from one context to another. I shall generally refer to this as the ‘long 1935 
essay’.12  
This in turn is followed by the ‘short 1935 essay’, a substantially abridged and slightly adapted 
version of the long essay that was published under the same title in October 1935 in the widely 
distributed Die Naturwissenschaften (pp. 259–267).  
Two short papers conclude this group of works: a book review for the Physikalische Zeitschrift of 
Popper’s Logik der Forschung [the original German version of The Logic of Scientific Discovery] (pp. 
269–271), which includes in particular criticisms of Popper’s remarks on quantum mechanics; and 
Hermann’s comment on the paper by Schlick (1936) at the Second International Congress for the 
Unity of Science of June 1936 in Copenhagen, which had been devoted to ‘The Problem of Causality’ 
(pp. 273–274). (These are two of the papers translated in this issue.)       
(d) The analysis of modern physics within neo-Kantian natural philosophy is extended to special and 
general relativity and to electrodynamics in three papers from 1937.  
‘Die Bedeutung der modernen Physik für die Theorie der Erkenntnis’ [‘The Significance of Modern 
Physics for the Theory of Knowledge’] (pp. 325–377) was the first of these to be written, and extends 
the idea of the applicability of Kantian notions relative to a context of description to the special and 
general theories of relativity.  
Then in ‘Über die Grundlagen physikalischer Aussagen in den älteren und den modernen Theorien’ 
[‘On the Foundations of Physical Statements in the Older and the Modern Theories’] (pp. 275–334), 
Hermann develops in detail her neo-Friesian position in natural philosophy. She starts with a general 
discussion of perception and experience, followed by the role of Kantian notions in classical 
mechanics, whose criteria of application are successively revised with the development of modern 
physics. Specifically, electrodynamics revises the use of substance, relativity the use of space and 
time, and quantum mechanics that of causality.  
The short paper ‘Die naturphilosophische Bedeutung des Übergangs von der klassischen zur 
modernen Physik’ [‘The Significance for Natural Philosophy of the Move from Classical to Modern 
Physics’] (pp. 379–381) briefly summarises this position. (It is the third paper also translated in this 
issue.) 
(e) Finally, wider issues are explored in four papers from 1948–1973. ‘Die Kausalität in der Physik’ 
[‘Causality in Physics’] (pp. 383–397) is actually Hermann’s presentation of her definitive view of 
quantum mechanics, and goes on in the final section to draw cautionary lessons for the debates on 
biology and free will. These ideas are then taken up again in more detail, specifically in the context 
of ethical responsibility (‘Ethik und Naturwissenschaft’ [‘Ethics and Natural Science’], pp. 399–407) 
 
12 The typesetting of this essay in the volume omits the distinction between sections or passages in larger and 
smaller type, which Hermann makes on the basis of mathematical accessibility. 
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and free will (‘Gibt es einen freien Willen?’ [‘Is There Free Will?’], pp. 409–416). ‘Die Bedeutung der 
Verhaltensforschung für die Kritik der Vernunft’ (pp. 417–432) [translated as ‘The Significance of 
Behaviour Study for the Critique of Reason’ (Henry 1973b)] concludes Part II of the volume, and 
presents Hermann's revision of Fries’ and Nelson’s ideas, in the context of both speculative and 
practical reason.  
Part III is another vast treasure trove (pp. 433–620), reproducing 55 letters by or to Hermann (and 
two further related documents), arranged chronologically within the period 1933–1982. They 
thankfully include even the rendering of stenographic annotations.13  
Two-thirds of these are from the 1930s (Letters 1–40) and provide exciting clues and details as to 
Hermann’s involvement with quantum mechanics. They also indicate that Hermann was an active 
and respected member of both the philosophy community in Germany – in which the Nelsonians 
probably played a larger role than is usually acknowledged – and the physics community. Indeed, 
they make it look less likely that Hermann needed help to publish in Naturwissenschaften.14 
The letters of the post-war period follow. The first two between Hermann and Weizsäcker touch on 
educational policy (Letters 41–42);15 then a group follows on Hermann’s sabbatical in the summer of 
1957 and winter of 1957/58, part of which was also spent with Weizsäcker in Göttingen (Letters 43–
47). There are four detailed letters between Hermann and Paul Bernays on whether Fries and Nelson 
had misinterpreted Kant, and related to Hermann’s own critique of them (Letters 48–51). Letters 
52–54 between Hermann and Max Jammer are extremely revealing on Hermann’s 1930s criticism of 
von Neumann. Two further letters from and to fellow Nelsonian Gustav Heckmann are also included, 
one relating to ethics (Letter 55) and another one to Hermann’s critique of Fries and Nelson (Letter 
56). Finally, Letter 57 to Van der Waerden includes a few memories of their teacher Emmy Noether. 
The short Part IV (pp. 621–655) is dedicated to Werner Heisenberg and Carl Friedrich von 
Weizsäcker, and begins with essays by Helmut Rechenberg and Michael Drieschner, sketching 
themes that are central to the Naturbild (the image of the natural world) of Heisenberg and 
Weizsäcker, respectively.  
Rechenberg passed away in November 2016 and was not able to polish the text (it is clearly the 
script of a talk, with the bibliography missing, and more typographical errors than in the rest of the 
volume). It provides an overview of how during the 1920s and 1930s Heisenberg’s ideas developed 
into the views he expressed in the wartime manuscript ‘Ordnung der Wirklichkeit’ (Heisenberg 
1942/1984), and of their later elaborations.    
 
13 Except for one letter to Dirac, and some from the papers of Hermann’s friend and fellow Nelsonian Gustav 
Heckmann, all documents come from the Archiv der sozialen Demokratie in Bad Godesberg, which contains 
Hermann’s Nachlass. Among the letters in the Heckmann papers are letters from Hermann to her mother, or 
rather copies (sometimes complete, sometimes mere collations of extracts) made presumably by Hermann’s 
brother Carl, who had also studied physics at Göttingen. Of these, Letter 12 is undated but presumably written 
between September and December 1934, and I suspect that the end of Letter 16 may contain fragments of 
one or two further letters. Letter 27 from Heisenberg to Hermann (in which he asks her to send an ‘offprint of 
her paper’ to Wolfgang Pauli) is dated 6 July with no year, but it surely refers to the long essay: on 2 July 1935 
Heisenberg had referred to it explicitly in writing to Pauli about his intention to formulate a reply to Einstein, 
Podolsky and Rosen (Pauli 1985, pp. 407–409; translated in Bacciagaluppi and Crull 2021). 
14 This point is speculative, of course. Cf. the General Discussion in Crull and Bacciagaluppi (2017, pp. 212–213). 
15 Specifically, the exchange concerns the ‘Tübingen Discussion’ which took place at the initiative of 
Weizsäcker, of physicist Walter Gerlach and of educator Georg Picht (mentioned also in Letter 47), to address 




The last two items are a very favourable review by Weizsäcker in the Physikalische Zeitschrift of 
Hermann’s long essay of 1935 (pp. 653–654), and a summary of her ‘Über die Grundlagen 
physikalischer Aussagen...’, which Weizsäcker wrote for the Zentralblatt für Mathematik und ihre 
Grenzgebiete (p. 655). 
The Appendix (pp. 657–663) mainly consists of short biographies of the authors of the accompanying 
essays in Parts I and IV. The volume has no index. 
 
4 Hermann’s work in physics and beyond 
I shall now attempt to give a quick overview of Hermann’s philosophical development (especially as 
represented in the volume), with an accent on Hermann's views on neo-Kantian natural philosophy. I 
shall expand on this in a separate paper (Bacciagaluppi in preparation a), but it is a fascinating 
subject that awaits a full treatment.16 There are also links to Hermann’s work in other areas, notably 
ethics, as can be glimpsed from some of the later papers published in the volume (see also Leal 
2017), as well as to her educational activities (cf. Letters 45 and 46).  
Hermann’s career began as a mathematician, indeed as Emmy Noether’s first doctoral student at 
Göttingen, and while the topic of her dissertation of 1925 is not directly related to her later work, a 
little by way of introduction may be interesting to most readers. 
Hermann’s dissertation provides explicit bounds for algorithms to solve certain problems in abstract 
algebra.17 It is thus considered to be work prefiguring the theory of computer algebra that began in 
the 1960s, as discussed by Ullrich in Part I (pp. 49–51). Ullrich also provides the context of 
Hermann's dissertation, in particular the role played by Emmy Noether in the development of 
abstract algebra (pp. 42–44). The direct impulse for the dissertation had been a previous dissertation 
on the same topic by Kurt Hentzelt (who had gone missing in action in October 1914), parts of which 
Noether herself had reworked and published in 1922 (Hentzelt 1922). Hermann was given the task of 
completing and systematising the rest of the Hentzelt’s results (pp. 44–46). In particular, as Hermann 
explains in the introduction to her dissertation, Hentzelt had only given a sketch of the calculation of 
the bounds (p. 97).   
As further explained by Kiyek, however, Hermann’s dissertation does not constitute a practical basis 
for computer algebra, because the algorithms and bounds she develops are far from optimal (p. 57). 
This is a point Hermann illustrates explicitly herself (p. 146). Also, as first noted by Veltzke (1958), 
one important bound given by Hermann is actually incorrect (pp. 55–56).18  
The early papers from 1926–1930 are more relevant to Hermann’s later work in that they contain 
hints of some important later themes. Most of the talk about Bolzano focuses on issues of 
epistemology, including notably the issue of ‘unmediated knowledge’, which in the post-war years 
Hermann will criticise in the context of Fries and Nelson. Also typically Friesian is the interest in the 
 
16 For existing work in this direction (with special reference to the neo-Kantian aspects of Hermann’s work on 
quantum mechanics), see Paparo (2017), Crull (2017), Banks (2017), and Cuffaro (2020). 
17 The translator of Hermann's dissertation, Michael Abramson, writes in his introduction: “The computational 
procedures which are presented in this paper include multivariate polynomial factorization, polynomial system 
solving, least common multiples, greatest common divisors, ideal quotients, divisibility of one ideal by another, 
fundamental ideals, norms, elementary divisor forms, associated prime ideals, primary decomposition, and 
isolated components” (Hermann 1998, p. 8). 
18 Both Ullrich and Kiyek provide further extensive references. 
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analysis of perception which is apparent in the appendices to Rubin.19 Indeed, for Fries the analysis 
of the a priori elements of our cognition is a matter of analysing our actual cognition – which is in 
fact a guiding principle in all of Hermann’s work. 
The crucial turn in Hermann’s natural philosophy comes with Hermann’s work on quantum 
mechanics, in particular her long essay of 1935.20 The paradigm example that Hermann uses is  
Heisenberg's g-ray microscope, in Weizsäcker’s (1931) analysis, in which one and the same collision 
between a photon and an electron can be used to measure the position or the momentum of the 
electron, depending on whether one registers the photon in the image plane or the focal plane of 
the microscope. In each of these contexts, one applies classical concepts (and indeed, according to 
Bohr, one must apply them). Such analyses reveal the causes for the measurement results, but 
classical concepts have only partial applicability, and which concepts are applicable to what extent 
depends on the chosen context of measurement.  
Hermann’s analysis is Friesian, in the sense that it is an analysis of how we make sense of our 
experience in the context of quantum mechanics. We see explicitly that the notion of causality 
remains indispensable but its criterion of application is revised. Hermann’s analysis also fits with 
elements of Fries’ and Nelson’s understanding of transcendental idealism: not even classical physics 
gives us descriptions of things in themselves as substances interacting causally in space and time, 
because these notions apply only to the models that we construct from our finite observations, and 
break down in the limit as demonstrated by the antinomies. The Kantian notions play the role of 
‘analogies’ that form the bridge between the ‘symbolic’, unintuitive physical description on the one 
hand and our observations on the other (between the formulas of physics and the data of 
perception). Hermann goes beyond Fries and Nelson, however, in arguing that quantum physics 
provides us with a further lesson: the physical description is itself fragmented, because it is always 
relative to a context of observation (‘splitting of truth’). One and the same physical process (the 
collision between the photon and the electron in the g-ray microscope) has more than one physical 
description, and the different contexts relative to which they are defined mutually limit the 
applicability of the Kantian a priori notions.21 
The next step in Hermann's exploration of natural philosophy was the investigation of special and 
general relativity in 1935–1936, published as ‘Die Bedeutung der modernen Physik für die Theorie 
der Erkenntnis’ (which won the Richard Avenarius prize of the Saxon Academy of Sciences in June 
1936). In it, Hermann first summarises her conclusions about quantum mechanics: the principle of 
causality remains indispensable, but needs to be dissociated from the idea of absolute knowledge of 
nature. Hermann then claims that in special and general relativity the measurements of (Euclidean) 
spatial lengths and temporal intervals, which themselves depend on the notion of simultaneity, play 
the analogous role: they remain indispensable in ordering our observations, but they lose their 
 
19 The first appendix criticises the idea put forward by Hillebrand (1929) that spatial qualities are innate 
features of perception analogous to colours (rather than spatial cognition being an ordering principle). The 
second appendix, while approving of the idea that perception of a whole is not the sum of perceptions of its 
parts, criticises Gestalt theory for seeking a purely physiological rather than cognitive and psychological 
explanation of this phenomenon. 
20 For further details and discussion of Hermann’s analysis of quantum mechanics, see the papers in Crull and 
Bacciagaluppi (2017), as well as Cuffaro (2020). Here I emphasise the relevance of Hermann's work on 
quantum mechanics in the wider context of her work. In Bacciagaluppi (in preparation b), I discuss it from the 
point of view of the history and philosophy of quantum mechanics – arguing in particular that Hermann is the 
only author who can lay claim to a systematic and comprehensive position combining the main elements of 
Bohr’s and Heisenberg’s views into a coherent ‘Copenhagen’ interpretation.  
21 See Crull (2017), Cuffaro (2020), and Bacciagaluppi (in preparation b) for further details. 
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absolute applicability, becoming relative to global or local inertial systems, respectively. Indeed, in 
special relativity the application of the classical spatiotemporal notions leads us to recognise length 
contraction and time dilation as objectively real physical processes, but crucially relative to an 
inertial system. And measurements of space and time in general relativity depend on the 
assumption of the local validity of special relativity.  
Hermann recognises that – unlike in quantum mechanics – in both special and general relativity 
there is an alternative absolute description in terms of a four-dimensional Minkowskian manifold. 
But this description is symbolic, i.e. unintuitive: the bridge between the physical formalism and 
observation is only provided by the intuitive notions of space and time, which thus remain 
indispensable. 
As Hermann explains to Weizsäcker  (Letter 35), in correspondence about a draft of her next major 
paper ‘Über die Grundlagen physikalischer Aussagen... ’ (first presented in September 1936 at a 
workshop she organised in Heidelberg22), this is the juncture where her analysis must rely on the 
psychology of cognition rather than merely the structure of physical reasoning – which by itself 
would not privilege the global or local inertial systems over the Minkowskian manifolds.  
Accordingly, ‘Über die Grundlagen physikalischer Aussagen... ’ – which is in fact Hermann's most 
comprehensive treatment of natural philosophy – starts with a discussion of how we make sense of 
our perceptions in the context of everyday experience. Perception itself only contains some hints of 
temporality (extended present, direct perception of change) and spatiality (relations between 
different forms of sensory perception), and we construct experience out of it through the subtly 
interrelated use of spatial and temporal intuitions and the concepts of causality and substance. The 
adequacy of these intutitions and concepts is only derived from their success in solving this problem, 
which is an open-ended task. But their certainty is derived from the fact that they are constitutive of 
how the problem is posed in the first place. 
In classical physics, there is no departure from the spatial and temporal intuitions or the concepts of 
causality and substance. Instead, the properties we ascribe to substances no longer correspond to 
sensory qualities (as they by and large do in the case of everyday experience), and we use the 
additional concept of interaction. As such, the mechanical world picture of classical physics conforms 
closely to the forms of intuition and categories deduced by Kant. As Hermann also explains in Letter 
35 to Weizsäcker, her strategy is then to identify at which points the development of modern physics 
appears to break with these notions: electrodynamics with the concept of substance, relativity with 
the intuitions of space and time, and quantum mechanics with the concept of causality.   
But Hermann argues that modern physics does not in fact abandon these notions. They remain 
indispensable and objective, instead their criteria of application turn out to depend on the relevant 
contexts of observation. What makes possible this renunciation of the absolute applicability of the 
Kantian notions is the fact that even in making sense of everyday experience they apply in subtly 
interrelated ways, so that in fact application of the Kantian notions in one context may turn out to 
constrain how they are applied in other contexts. In electrodynamics, the fields describe interactions 
between matter or instead vibrations in a non-material ether, depending on the experimental 
question asked. In relativity, descriptions of interacting objects become relative to inertial systems. 
In quantum mechanics, spatiotemporal and causal concepts are themselves mutually 
complementary, and even the formal (‘symbolical’) description in terms of wave functions depends 
on the context of observation. 
 
22 For some further details, see the introduction to the Hermann translations in this issue. 
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‘Über die Grundlagen physikalischer Aussagen... ’ is also a Friesian work in its analysis of how the a 
priori principles are applied in bridging the gap between the data and the formalism. As mentioned 
already in the discussion of Hermann's analysis of quantum mechanics, however, the relational 
aspect of her analysis is an important respect in which Hermann is herself departing from Fries and 
Nelson. The latter two firmly believed in the absoluteness of the applicability of the a priori 
principles, even though for them it was an empirical matter to discover how they were to be applied. 
This is a larger issue than it might seem at first sight (for both theoretical and pragmatic reasons), 
and was to lead to a gradual but very substantial critique of Fries and Nelson in Hermann’s later 
work and correspondence.  
There is in fact a marked peculiarity in Fries’ critique of reason, which is taken over by Nelson. Kant 
distinguishes between the two faculties of sensibility [Sinnlichkeit] and understanding [Verstand], 
which are both essential to cognition. As Kant famously puts it in the Critique of Pure Reason: 
 Without sensibility no object would be given to us; and without understanding no object would be 
 thought. Thoughts without content are empty; intuitions without concepts are blind. Hence it is just 
 as necessary that we make our concepts sensible (i.e. that we add the object to them in intuition) as it 
 is necessary that we make our intuitions understandable (i.e., that we bring them under concepts). 
 Moreover, this capacity and this ability cannot exchange their functions. The understanding cannot 
 intuit anything, and the senses cannot think anything. Only from their union can cognition arise (Kant 
 1996, pp. A51/B75–76). 
Fries, however, identifies a third independent faculty of ‘pure’ reason [Vernunft]. Thus, while for 
Kant the forms of intuition relate to sensibility, for Fries and for Nelson there is also ‘pure intuition’ 
which is independent of sensibility and provides ‘unmediated knowledge’. The same applies for the 
categories of understanding. And the Friesian process of introspection, the psychological 
investigation that reveals the a priori elements in knowledge, is in fact making explicit this 
unmediated knowledge. 
Fries intends this quite literally. As Hermann quotes him in a 1971 letter to Heckmann: “Whoever 
may have looked just a few times through the good instruments of a Herschel or a Schröter, would 
possess in the unmediated dark representations of his mind the same astronomical knowledge as 
them. Their superiority would lie only in the cultivation of their inner introspective reflection” (Letter 
56). The result, as Hermann summarises in a letter to Bernays, a criticism he himself had made of 
Fries,23 is that “his philosophising stands under the banner of rational faith, in fact a faith that sees 
humans as possessing a certainty of belief resting in the darkness of the unconscious” (Letter 51) – 
and in fact a faith that she distrusts. 
Nelson’s understanding of the process of introspection is considerably clearer. As explained, for 
example, by Cuffaro (2020), it is to be thought as analogous to extracting axioms and 
metamathematical principles from the analysis of actual mathematics – something that in fact had 
brought Nelson in close interaction with Hilbert. But according to Hermann, there is also a significant 
difference in how Nelson and Fries conceive of unmediated knowledge (even though Nelson did not 
perceive it as such). As she explains in Letter 56 (and in the last paper in Part II, ‘Die Bedeutung der 
Verhaltensforschung für die Kritik der Vernunft’), Nelson believes that the sensible and rational 
contributions to factual knowledge consist of separate unmediated components: purely a posteriori 
sense impressions which are ordered through purely a priori intuitions and categories in the process 
of reflection. And only these constitute immediate knowledge. But in that respect Nelson’s position 
is no more tenable than Fries’. Indeed, as is clear already from the discussion of everyday experience 
 
23 Bernays (1953), which appeared in the same volume as Hermann (1953). 
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in ‘Über die Grundlagen physikalischer Aussagen... ’ (or even from her 1935 review of Popper), 
Hermann does not believe there are any pure sensory experiences, nor does she believe that there 
are any incorrigible judgements.  
The fundamental problem with Nelson is that, although he believes that the uncovering of the a 
priori principles and their criteria of application is an empirical matter, he also believes that once 
these are uncovered they form an absolute framework that must be adhered to by anyone who 
accepts the universal validity of reason. Hermann took exception to this as early as the turn of the 
year 1926, when Nelson asked her to comment on his ‘deduction of the moral law’ (Leal 2017). But it 
was in her reflection on quantum mechanics and her development of natural philosophy that 
Hermann identified the way in which this tendency in Nelson’s philosophy could be set aside, 
namely in the recognition that what we have learned from modern physics is that the criteria of 
application of the a priori principles – while being objective – are also relative to the context in which 
they are being applied. 
After the war, Hermann devoted less of her time to philosophical research, but she applied the 
lessons of her work on natural philosophy more widely. In a number of papers in Part II (‘Die 
Kausalität in der Physik’ from 1948, ‘Ethik und Naturwissenschaft’ from 1950, and ‘Gibt es einen 
freien Willen?’ from 1968) Hermann applies her insights about causality to the debates about free 
will, life, and ethical and political responsibility: one should not fall into the trap of thinking that 
modern physics has replaced causality with chance, but modern physics has shattered the 
mechanical world picture, and these debates pose questions defined with respect to quite different 
contexts.  
In a number of other works and letters, Hermann confronts the limitations of Fries’ and Nelson’s 
thinking head-on. This is first evident in her ‘Die Überwindung des Zufalls’ (Hermann 1953) 
[‘Conquering Chance’ (Hermann 1991)], in which she removes the absolutist aspect from Nelson’s 
ethics. As she writes to Heckmann in Letter 56, by the time of the Nelson centenary in 1962 she was 
already criticising explicitly Fries’ and Nelson’s position, rejecting their view of “a – static – reservoir 
of unmediated knowledge”, in favour of “the power of reason to – dynamically – cognise, judge, 
trust”. But at the time she was also unsure of how to think of Kant’s own approach to the critique of 
reason (given Fries’ and Nelson’s critique of Kant and her own critique of Fries and Nelson). 
In a fascinating exchange with Paul Bernays between May and December of 1966 (Letters 48–51), 
Hermann then dissects Fries’ and Nelson’s criticism of Kant. They accuse Kant of ‘formal idealism’, 
the doctrine that one can derive transcendental idealism purely from the aprioricity of the intuitions 
and the categories.24 But according to Hermann, Kant nowhere attempts such a derivation. Rather, 
the premise in the arguments Fries and Nelson are criticising is always and only that space and time 
are forms of sensible intuition and the categories are the forms of thinking about experience. What 
makes Fries and Nelson blind to this, Hermann suspects, is precisely the fact that in addition to 
sensibility and understanding they consider a separate faculty of reason. Kant does not require 
‘unmediated knowledge’, and (as she puts it to Heckmann in Letter 56): 
 
24 As explained in Cuffaro (2018, Sections 2 and 10), Fries and Nelson see Kant as confused about whether 
transcendental idealism is a thesis about the world or about knowledge. They take him as arguing 
unsuccessfully for the ontological thesis from the aprioricity of the forms of intuition and the categories, while 
arguing successfully for the epistemic thesis in the doctrine of the antinomies. Thanks to Mike Cuffaro for very 




 According to Kant the categories are not concepts in which unmediated cognisance by reason is 
 represented conceptually, but correspond to functions (this is Kant’s expression!) of the thinking 
 about experience as determined by reason.  
The exchange with Bernays contains further textual analysis of Kant, but Hermann published the 
essentials of her critique of Fries and Nelson in the last of the papers contained in Part II, which 
appeared also in English as Henry (1973b), ‘Die Bedeutung der Verhaltensforschung für die Kritik der 
Vernunft’, both in the context of speculative reason and in that of practical reason, emphasising how 
the study of our behaviour as agents and as social beings forms part of the anthropological critique 
of reason – which Fries and Nelson rightly identified as the task deriving from Kant’s approach.  
Hermann never published a comprehensive treatment of natural philosophy along the lines of her 
revised understanding of Kant and her critique of Fries and Nelson. But the depth and subtlety of her 
work, her uncompromising honesty, and her constant dialogue with science make her arguably the 
most modern and relevant representative of the neo-Kantian tradition in natural philosophy. 
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Appendix – existing translations of works by Hermann   
The history of translations of works by Hermann is briefly as follows (see the bibliography for full 
details): 
• 1947: Hermann’s short book Politik und Ethik – including in particular her criticism of the 
apathy of German intellectuals under the Nazi regime – was translated as Politics and Ethics. 
• 1973: ‘Die Bedeutung der Verhaltensforschung für die Kritik der Vernunft’ (pp. 417–432) was 
published simultaneously in German and English in the German and English editions of Ratio 
(a journal originally strongly connected to the Nelsonian movement). 
• 1991: Hermann’s article ‘Die Überwindung des Zufalls’, revising her teacher Leonard 
Nelson’s ethics, was translated by Peter Winch as ‘Conquering Chance’. 
• 1996: French translation of ‘Die naturphilosophischen Grundlagen der Quantenmechanik’ 
(long version, pp. 205–258). Published on the initiative of Léna Soler and with two 
accompanying essays by her, this translation marked the beginning of the renewed interest 
in Grete Hermann’s work on quantum mechanics. 
• 1998: Hermann’s doctoral dissertation with Emmy Noether, ‘Die Frage der endlich vielen 
Schritte in der Theorie der Polynomideale’ (pp. 95–147), translated as ‘The question of 
finitely many steps in polynomial ideal theory’. 
• 1999: Dirk Lumma’s translation of the short version of ‘Die naturphilosophischen 
Grundlagen der Quantenmechanik’ (pp. 259–267), with an introduction, published in the 
Harvard Review of Philosophy.  
• 2008: Michiel Seevinck posted online a translation of Section 7 (on von Neumann’s 
impossibility proof) of the long version of Hermann’s essay, but this translation is currently 
no longer available. 




• 2017: Translation of the long version of ‘Die naturphilosophischen Grundlagen der 
Quantenmechanik’, also in Crull and Bacciagaluppi (2017). 
• 2021: New translation of the short version of ‘Die naturphilosophischen Grundlagen der 
Quantenmechanik’ (based on our translation of the long version) in Bacciagaluppi and Crull 
(2021). 
Additionally, Hermann published in English an encyclopedia entry on Leonard Nelson (Henry-




Archiv der sozialen Demokratie, Bad Godesberg, Germany (Nachlass Grete Henry-Hermann). 
Dirac Archive, University Libraries, Florida State University, Tallahassee, FL, U.S.A. (a copy of the 
Dirac Archive is also located in the Churchill Archives, Churchill College, Cambridge, U.K.). 
Private collection Dieter Krohn, Bonn, Germany (Nachlass Gustav Heckmann). 
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